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Abstract This paper reports on an experiment concerning the social construction
of statistical definitions, where the first census of Higher Education Institutions in
Europe has been developed. It conceptualizes the construction of indicators as a
social process of definitions and boundaries’ negotiation, involving value judg-
ments, social and political opinions, as well as practical interests and power
strategies of actors. The paper exemplifies this process on three issues, namely the
social demand for establishing a census, the controversy concerning the definition of
a perimeter as well as the selection of indicators, and the nature of comparability
judgments. We first conclude that the socio-political dimension has to be explicitly
taken into account when designing statistical systems; second, that social scientists
involved in this process need to openly recognize the conflicts around the definition
of indicators; third, that the objectified and taken for granted status of indicators
makes them a powerful instrument to influence policy decisions and, that indicator
designers need to make their own value judgments and interests fully transparent.
Keywords S&T indicators  Classification systems 
Higher education institutions  Sociology of measurement  European Research Area
Introduction
The current study was commissioned by an authoritative statistical institution
(EUROSTAT) and two Directorates General of the European Commission, an
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unusual combination of forces for a feasibility study. Our task was practical: we had
to support the creation of a census of all institutions of higher education (HEI) in
Europe. For the larger census population, and for the research active sub-population,
we had to ensure the delivery of a set of indicators and lay down the foundation for
regular data collection by EUROSTAT. We approached the task with the kind of
scientific and professional attitude needed in studies with a practical aim, i.e. to
deliver an outcome according to the highest professional standard needed to reach a
practical and usable result. In doing so, our attitude was technical and oriented
towards a thorough definition of phenomena for accurate classification and
measurement. Thus we anticipated a number of definitional, technical, and practical
issues, for which we were confident a reasonable and technical solution could be
found.
Over time, however, we first had to admit that questions of a non-technical nature
were at stake and that classification and measurement issues are deeply embedded
into political concerns, and more largely, into the way society represents and
intervenes with higher education and research. Second, it also became evident that
the perspective of an external, objective observer, who crafts a set of definitions
according to rigorous methodological rules and is not involved in the conflict of
interpretations, was not adequate. Any position supposed to be neutral and merely
technical turned out, inescapably, to involve value judgments and we had to
recognize that it would have been impossible to fulfill our task without entering into
the interpretation and political game. In turn, this raises deep questions on the role
of our profession and on the value of the indicator systems we are developing.
In this paper we propose a reinterpretation of this experience, focusing on how
we addressed these socio-political issues and how we managed to find solutions
which were acceptable both to the involved stakeholders as well as to our
professional community; further, we inquire how the emerging representation of
European higher education systems was influenced by these choices, as well as by
the socio-political environment of the project.
Our account is an autobiographical one, as we managed the project, we wrote
most reports and we participated actively in meetings, both inside the project and
with the European Commission and EUROSTAT. Accordingly, while we provide
reasonable arguments to support our interpretation, we cannot claim for objectivity
or verifiability: not only were we too involved in the process for any scientific
standard, but also most of our sources cannot be disclosed and verified by
independent observers.
Rather, our aim is to reflectively interpret the grounds on which the involved
actors negotiated the choices and constructed consensus, by highlighting the
complex mix of interests and values that drove them. To this aim, after the end of
the project, we began mobilizing a large set of literature covering sociology of
science and S&T indicators to help us in this hermeneutic process—rather than as
theoretical devices to develop hypotheses to be tested as in more conventional
scholarly work. While scientists cannot claim to be free from values and interests
when delivering political expertise, we claim that this commitment to reflectivity
and to reasonableness should distinguish scientific expertise from other forms of
competence in the political arena.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section ‘‘Mobilizing Theoretical
Perspectives,’’ we make use of a number of theoretical perspectives on categori-
zation, classification and measurement from different disciplines to identify some
key issues to interpret the EUMIDA experiences. In the following sections, we
organize the re-interpretation around three issues, namely the rationale for devising
a HEI-level classification (‘‘From Mass Education to Differentiation: The New
Social Demand for Measurement’’), the controversy on how to define the perimeter
of higher education, (‘‘What are HEIs? The Controversy on Perimeter and
Classification’’) and the operationalization of measures of HEI activities (‘‘The
Conventional Nature of Statistics: Definitions and Measurement Issues’’). We
conclude by contextualizing this experience in the broader framework of the
relationships between science and politics.
Mobilizing Theoretical Perspectives
In general terms, our task was one of categorization (i.e. define how to partition
observations, or the perimeter and boundaries of objects), of classification (i.e.
define the rules by which an observation is assigned to one or another of categories)
and of measurement (i.e. to define how the characteristics of organizations can be
quantified and compared). These are clearly pre-requisite activities for any official
statistics aimed at producing censuses. There is a rich body of literature that has
discussed the cognitive, epistemological, sociological, and political dimensions of
these activities.
Cognitive and Epistemological Perspectives on Classification
The act of placing objects into categories is one of the most fundamental activities
in the life of individuals. Classical theories of categorization posit that categories are
constructed by identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership,
consistent with philosophical objectivism, which assumes that it is possible to
identify the ‘‘important physical properties’’ that allow for the division of the world
into kinds (Bryant 2000).
A consistent literature in cognitive psychology has challenged this assessment,
suggesting two alternative views. One is that the membership into categories is not
binary, but fuzzy. Objects are assigned to categories on the basis of a similarity
judgment, which is the sum of features shared by various objects weighted for their
salience, or the frequency with which these appear in the category. The features then
become abstract across instances, following a probabilistic approach, which is also
called ‘‘family resemblance’’ (McCloskey and Glucksberg 1978). Another view
suggests that categories are not constructed on the basis of features, but of mental
models that link the features to other deep characteristics, typically of a causal or
functional kind (Murphy and Medin 1985). While classical and probabilistic
theories could be used to support the prediction that categorizations of the world
converge, more recent theories strongly support a pluralistic view. There is no way
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to develop a rule or procedure to eliminate the possible divergence in classifications.
We need theories of higher order if we want to make sense of why certain
classifications are adopted and others discarded.
As scientists should be better equipped to construct theories that allow
convergence, one could hope that recourse to scientific expertise (as in the case of
EUMIDA) helps to address this problem. Unfortunately, epistemological reflections
have shown that this is not the case. Even in one of the apparently more robust
taxonomic exercises in biology—the identification of species—there are several
legitimate alternative classifications (Dupre` 1993). On the basis of these and other
contributions, a pluralistic view of scientific classification has been proposed, which
admits the coexistence of alternative taxonomic systems (Bryant 2000).
In terms of our task, this literature hints to the fact that we cannot expect to rely
on objective and clear-cut criteria to identify and classify HEIs, but that this will be
a contestable exercise, where fuzzy and uncertain cases will emerge, while the
criteria for classification will be subject to disagreement, related to diverging
assumptions on the core characteristics of HEIs. Further, we expect that
classification will be contingent and subject to controversy among the actors
involved.
Classifications, Social Order and Controversies
Social sciences have insisted that classifications have a social nature and are by no
means features of an objective reality (Espeland and Stevens 1998). Categories are
important because they allow people to keep appropriate distance from others in
social interactions, allowing secondary socialization involving anonymous persons
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). Thus, classification systems have a tendency to hide
the controversial nature of their establishment and to present themselves as naturally
occurring systems, while the conflicts over their origin are removed (Bowker and
Leigh Star 1999).
Several authors emphasize that this process is intrinsically related to the
emergence of conflicts. In the theory of distinction, social conflict is not only
generated by the fight for material goods which are subject to conditions of scarcity,
but also by the need to exploit the rent from distinction, which results from the
possession of symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984). This requires the ability to stabilize
the classifications that separate social groups, establishing the rules for access or
exclusion. These classifications have the important property of transforming the
continuous distribution of wealth into a discrete distribution of status, marked by
binary rules of inclusion/exclusion. Titles of education granted by schools and
universities are considered one of the most important tools to enforce distinction.
Consequently, controversies over classifications are a central element in the
societal power struggle (Latour 1987) and their stability is not related to objectivity,
but rather to a transient outcome from the resolution of controversies, where social
actors reach an agreement on how to include individual cases into predefined
categories (The´venot 2001). The revision of classifications is thus central to the
reversal of social power structures.
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In terms of our task, we expect that disagreement over classifications of HEIs
also reflects struggles between actors concerning their role and power in governing
higher education, while the quest for a HEI-level classification and data collection
is also likely to reflect broad changes in governance of higher education.
Moreover, we expect that existing classification schemes are largely conventional
and based on lasting domination structures rather than on objective choices and
that they assume a taken-for-granted status which makes their revisions highly
difficult.
Modern Bureaucracy and Measurement as a Technology of Distance
A third perspective relates the development of statistical systems to the emergence
of the bureaucracy and constitution of the modern national State (Porter 1995;
Desrosie`res 1993).
According to this view, classifications are a fundamental tool to govern societies
without being obliged to address and solve individual cases. Through the use of
classifications and their material embodiments (maps, lists, forms etc.) it is possible
to ‘‘govern at a distance,’’ that is, to control actions that are displaced in time and
space, beyond the boundaries of locality and community (Porter 1995). In this
perspective, the measurement of social reality through statistical systems is
necessary for accountability, as the modern State faces the challenge to offer valid
arguments to citizens who are not satisfied by propaganda (Desrosie`res 2008). This
argument also applies to the measurement of science and technology, one of the
more recent branches of statistical activity (Godin 2005).
This literature shows that in most cases the rules for taxonomies and
classification are subject to considerable controversy and that statistical classifica-
tions are not robust, since different experts end up in classifying individual cases in
largely different ways in a remarkable proportion of cases (Desrosie`res and
Thevenot 1988).
Thus, we foresee a deep connection between the request for a census and the
emergence of a European policy in research and higher education. Further, this
perspective points to the lasting institutionalization and conventional nature of
existing statistical systems in the field and thus that revising their content will be
deeply entrenched with political and institutional struggles at the European and
national level.
Standardization and Sociology of Quality
There is a strong rationale for the creation of systems of classifications as
instruments for the enhancement of efficiency in economic transactions. In order to
conclude a contract among parties, there must be agreement on the content of the
exchange, an issue which inevitably includes a procedure to determine the quality of
goods, as well as a system able to determine the citizenship of traders, in case a
dispute over the terms of the trade must be brought to the attention of the
jurisdiction. As these systems are subject to indivisibilities—a census is complete,
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or it has no value—from an economic point of view it would be highly inefficient if
measurement costs were the burden of individual traders (Barzel 1982).
The economic analysis of measurement and standardization also offers a useful
perspective on this issue (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). On the one hand, there
are obvious gains in reaching universal systems of measurement because of
measurement costs savings. Thus we should expect convergence around common
standards of measurement. At the same time, due to the possibility that a plurality
of agents engage in standardization activities and due to the importance of
network externality, it may be that in equilibrium several competing standards
survive. Thus, there is not a compelling economic argument for uniqueness of
standards.
A further relevant perspective is the one of economic sociology and, more
specifically, of quality markets, where quality is difficult to measure and more
important than price in economic exchanges (White 1981). Typical examples are
markets for customized professional services, high level expertise, or some areas of
cultural industry (Karpik 2007). These goods are of uncertain quality, so that the
perception of quality by customers is crucial for market exchanges. This perception
does not depend on actions undertaken by producers, such as the classical devices
examined by economics (reputation, signaling, guarantees etc.), but rather on
external devices to which individuals delegate their trust in selecting producers of
singular goods (Blank 2007). Two of them, denominations and rankings, are of
direct interest here.
Denominations are used almost everywhere as a consequence of accreditation
processes, typically managed by the State. Uncertainty is reduced by giving
accredited institutions the monopoly of the use of the name, and by preventing
others to use the denomination ‘‘university.’’ On the one hand, the coordination
between demand and supply based on denominations prevents establishing internal
differentiation within any given category. While uncertainty is reduced across
categories, it remains significant within categories, leaving consumers with a great
deal of autonomy in the final judgment. On the other hand, the coordination based
on rankings simplifies a large number of dimensions of quality into a small
manageable number. Rankings try to reduce the uncertainty within categories, at the
expense of simplifying the criteria for choice. The prediction is one of incompat-
ibility between denomination and ranking, or more generally, between mechanisms
of relative and absolute qualification (Karpik 2007).
In terms of our task, this points to the close connection between classification and
measurement issues on one side, the conception of higher education as a quality
market on the other, as well as to the conceptual difference between the
categorization of HEIs and educational activities and continuous measurement
across a scale, providing the ‘‘customers’’ with more power in selecting the
provider. Both are related to the lasting debate on steering of higher education,
around notions like quasi-markets (Teixeira et al. 2004), competitive differentiation
(Deiaco et al. 2010), as well as the emergence of ‘‘steering at distance’’ in New
Public Management (Ferlie et al. 2008).
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From Mass Education to Differentiation: The New Social Demand
for Measurement
If statistical systems are complex devices aimed at governing societies at a distance,
where is the demand for introducing a radical innovation such as a register? How
did the main actors involved in the project—the European Commission, EURO-
STAT and Member States, represented by the National Statistical Authorities
(NSA)—respond to this challenge? And finally, what were the implications for the
design of the census?
Traditionally, the two fields of statistics involved in EUMIDA—educational and
R&D statistics—were largely content with the production of national-level
aggregates and indicators. These allowed international organizations like UNESCO,
OECD, and the European Commission to track the progress of individual countries
based on indicators such as enrolment, graduation rates, and investments in R&D
(Godin 2001). Interestingly, the data on students and R&D expenditures did not
have to match, as they were considered to be two distinct sectors of economic
activity.
More detailed data was produced by national governments for the purpose of
steering the system, but they were held by the State administration and not disclosed
to the public. This system matched a mode of governance in most European
countries where higher education was considered to be part of the public
administration, regulated by bureaucratic means concerning budgets and personnel,
with the relevant actors in the political game being the State and the academic
communities (Clark 1983). The non-existence of HEIs as political actors also
implied their non-existence as statistical units—as confirmed by the counterexample
of the US where a national census has existed for many years (the Carnegie
classification; McCormick and Zhao 2005).
This picture has evolved along with deep modifications to the governance of
higher education systems (Paradeise et al. 2009). New public management
narratives introduced notions like ‘‘steering at distance’’ and competitive differen-
tiation (Ferlie et al. 2008), considering HEIs as strategic actors which should
develop their specific profile (Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2008). Despite differences
among countries (Bleiklie et al. 2011), the steering of higher education in Europe
moved towards granting more autonomy and requesting accountability from HEIs,
introducing evaluation systems (Whitley and Gla¨ser 2007), as well as competition in
the allocation of public funds (Jongbloed 2008). These narratives also spurred an
increasing request for measurement by other audiences like students wishing to
decide where to enroll, funding agencies and private companies in need of
evaluating the quality of research. It is fair to say that we largely adhered to a vision
of higher education as a competitive quasi-market where HEIs are a strategic actor
(with all the nuances that educated scholars might attribute to these notions) and that
this vision, shared with the European Commission, constituted the normative
foundation of the choices made in constructing the census.
Responses of national statistical systems to these changes have been highly
differentiated: institutional-level data on education (students, graduates) were
thought to be the least problematic, and in many European countries, HEI-level data
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has been made available by the NSA (Bonaccorsi et al. 2007). On the contrary,
measures of research output were considered to be highly controversial, as they
allowed customers to directly judge quality; hence their production by national
authorities has been limited to a few countries who endorse the NPM rationale (e.g.
UK with the Research Assessment Exercise). The social demand in this area has
been covered by independent providers through different types of rankings; public
controversies on their validity are unsurprising as there is no broad social agreement
on which measures to use—rankings are social constructions, but they cannot claim
to hold a validity endorsed by the State (Weingart and Maasen 2007).
The socio-political context was also shaped by the process of European
integration and the increasing role of the European Union in research and higher
education policies after the launch of the European Research Area (ERA); while
international organizations in the past were largely content to compare countries and
to advise national states, the ERA foresees a European space of research where
individual actors compete across countries and thus request openness in their
national systems and a transfer of competencies from the national to the European
level (Kuhlmann 2001). Different scenarios concerning the configuration European
research policy raise issues concerning the relationships between global and local
and the extent to which a European governance system is preferable to a federal
setting allowing adaptation to national specificities. As a matter of fact, the
European statistical system in higher education is still largely based on the federal
approach developed by the OECD, with EUROSTAT loosely coordinating the
NSA’s mastering their own data on the grounds of national interest. On the contrary,
DG Research has taken a more proactive stance when producing analyses at the HEI
level using non-statistical data (European Commission 2011).
Thus, the project was characterized by a complex constellation, where the
cooperation of actors with different goals and attitudes was required to achieve a
consensus. DG research had the role of promoter, as micro-data on HEIs were a
priority in the monitoring of the European Research Area, but at the same time it did
not own the resources and the legitimacy to establish long-term data collection.
EUROSTAT was involved through its educational division, a logical choice due to
the fact that data collection at universities is part of educational statistics (UOE
2006), but which made it difficult to address their specificities (in respect to
schools); EUROSTAT was caught between the push of the Commission for the
census and concern for the issues it would have raised in terms of relationships with
national statistical authorities—as such they stated that their main role was to
produce national aggregates, whereas micro-data should have been produced by
other actors. In turn, the NSA had different attitudes depending on national cultures
and policies; those in countries with a tradition of openness who were respectively
adopting new public management practices, held no reservations against a European
census but were concerned about two issues: the risk of an additional workload and
the possibility that data would be integrated in the census, where no consensus
existed at the political level, thus jeopardizing their political legitimacy. On the
contrary, in countries with a stronger tradition of centralization and secrecy
concerning data considered sensible for national policies the NSA had a negative
attitude towards the census as such.
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In this context, our role was not to propose technical alternatives for decision-
makers, but rather to mediate between ideas and interests by devising solutions that
would gather sufficient support to be accomplished (Barre´ 2004). In this respect, the
project was highly successful: the census published by the European Commission
only excluded France—whose authorities refused to make HEI level data public—
as well as Denmark and the French-speaking part of Belgium for organizational
reasons at the NSA. It is reasonable that, if the census becomes widely used, these
countries will provide their data.
However, retrospectively this context had deep implications on how the census
was constructed. Thus, issues and topics which held a risk of raising the opposition
of many national states had to be avoided—such as the measurement of research
output, data that was not generally available, or financial data that was considered
confidential by some national laws.
A helpful technical device in managing this tension between coverage and
completeness was the distinction between a full perimeter, for which we were
requested to collect a core set of data, and a restricted perimeter of research-active
HEIs, for which the tender requested an extended set of data characterizing research
activities. We managed this distinction strategically by including in the core set of
data only indicators available in all countries—a few organizational descriptors (like
region, foundation years, etc.) and the number of students and staff. Completeness,
non-confidentiality and the lack of controversies characterized this dataset and
allowed the European Commission to publish it and to foresee a key role of
EUROSTAT in a regular data collection. On the contrary, the extended dataset
included indicators that would be considered as more interesting for analytical
purposes, like data on revenues and expenditures, the share of international students
and staff, R&D expenditures. Not only are there many unsolved measurement and
comparability issues for this data, they are also unavailable for a substantial share of
countries due to their unsystematic collection or for confidentiality reasons (like
financial data in most new member states).
We further resorted to a strategy already adopted in the Frascati manual (OECD
2002), where the handbook proposes general guidelines, but leaves the NSA with
the responsibility of deciding how to implement hiding national differences behind a
shield of uniform definitions. This avoided pushing standardization too far and
directly addressing national specificities related to political reasons, to differences in
the organization of higher education or diverging practices of data collection, which
would have made a consensus impossible and would have impacted national
practices.
What are HEIs? The Controversy on Perimeter and Classification
If statistical systems rest on reaching agreements on how to solve controversies, the
main controversy in EUMIDA concerned the core of the census, namely the
definition of what HEIs are, as well as of operational criteria in order to decide on
inclusion in the perimeter.
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The conceptual roots of the definition were at stake, since educational statistics
are constructed around the notion of educational programs and considerable effort
was invested by the NSA to refine their classification by level, while national
aggregates are computed by attributing students and teachers to educational levels.
In this perspective, higher education meant the aggregation of all curricula classified
under levels 5 and 6 in the International Standard Classification of Educational
Degrees (ISCED; UOE 2006), usually labeled as tertiary education. From our
perspective, this approach, conceptually lacked an understanding of HEIs as
organizations. Furthermore, in countries like Germany and Switzerland, profes-
sional associations also offer vocational degrees as a supplemental activity, yet
these can hardly be considered as educational institutions.
Unsurprisingly, issues of legitimacy compounded this controversy: our expertise
in constructing statistics was questioned by our statistical partners—as it was
considered that legitimacy is rooted in State power and the professional tradition of
statisticians. It was pointed out that while in scholarly research data is debatable by
definition, statistical data claims a more objective status. Obviously, the distinction
is not an epistemological one, but political and functional, statistics cannot fulfill its
functions without granting it an objective status and excluding the possibility of
revisions.
To address this issue, we adopted different strategies: first, we showed that the
debate was related to two different conceptions of higher education, one centered
around educational programs, the other one around HEIs as (multifunctional)
organizations—a view which matched the goals of DG research, whose main focus
was on characterizing the European-level research universities. Second, at the
technical level, we proved our competence in educational statistics by carefully
referring to the Educational Statistics manual (UOE 2006), but also by questioning
its objectivity by displaying inconsistencies in some of its definitions. Third, we
strategically used the Swiss and German cases to display that the NSA is not willing
to collect institutional-level data in such a broad perimeter for data availability and
confidentiality reasons. The outcome of this debate allowed for the construction of
the census around an organizational definition of HEIs, which did not yet exist in
official statistics, thus transferring some insights of higher education studies into it.
However, functional criteria alone are not sufficient to identify a perimeter, as
categories and distinctions between organizational populations are cognitive
constructs related to representations of the world that are specific to one audience
(Ruef 2000). In our case, the definition of higher education institutions is a political
decision, endorsed in most countries through a legal act, with practical implications
in terms of status, right to award diplomas and access to public resources. This
socially and politically constructed perimeter is continuously evolving, with
institutions striving to be included (Kyvik 2004). Unfortunately, there was no single
audience to which we could refer, as decisions on inclusion are largely national and
similar institutions might be included or not depending on the country.
The EUMIDA handbook defines ‘‘higher education institutions as entities
recognizable as distinct organizations and whose main activity is providing
education at the tertiary level, i.e. at the levels 5 and/or 6 of ISCED. Recognizable
means that their boundaries can be identified rather unambiguously, they have an
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internal organizational structure and, at least in principle, their own budget.’’
Further, the handbook provides examples and delimitation criteria, including the
stipulation that education should be the main activity, thus excluding public
research organizations.
Interestingly, it turns out that this definition can hardly be operationalized. For
most public organizations, the boundaries criterion is ambiguous—and, if taken
seriously, it would have excluded many universities from the perimeter as not
having their own budget or even not hiring their own personnel (like in France).
This reveals that its function was not operational, but symbolic, to refer to the
literature on public-sector organizations which considers the definition of a
boundary and control over a budget as central components of their transformation
towards corporate actors (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). At the same time,
decisions on the inclusion in the perimeter were taken at the national level based on
political or legal considerations. This definition, exactly because it cannot be
seriously operationalized, allowed decoupling the conceptual framework (which
needs to be consistent at the European level) from the definition of the perimeter by
NSA (where national specificities need to be taken into account).
Nevertheless, a few local controversies emerged. Some categories of institutions,
like military schools or arts schools, are only included in some countries; these
differences are unavoidable, e.g. if military schools are considered as part of higher
education in one country, whereas as internal training activities of the army in
another.
Second, while in most countries private institutions accredited by the State were
included in the perimeter, controversies emerged in two cases. In Spain, the
Statistical Authority refused to include private institutions in the register, claiming
they were not part of the public educational system; as a consequence, the perimeter
includes only the 47 public universities. In a few countries in Eastern Europe,
Statistical Authorities included private institutions in the census, but warned that it
would be impossible to obtain financial data. In practice, even though private
institutions are accredited by the State and funded, they obtain a treatment under
which their financial accounts are not publicly available. We discovered that
considerable political controversies were in place in these countries, with a direct
impact on the availability of official statistics.
Third, a controversy concerning public research organizations (PRO) emerged,
since some PROs oriented towards academic science training of PhD students, even
if few of them have the right to award the PhD degree. The criterion that education
should be a major activity excludes them from the perimeter, which we considered
as a fair choice to avoid inclusion of most of public-sector research. However, in
Bulgaria, the Academy of Sciences accounts for 1/6 of all PhD degrees and it would
have been politically not acceptable to exclude it—a situation reflected in R&D
statistics, where the Academy of Sciences and the French CNRS are included in the
higher education sector.
In the end, the EUMIDA perimeter includes 91% of the students at the tertiary
level in educational statistics (source: EUROSTAT), displaying that the EUMIDA
perimeter is not much smaller than the whole tertiary education. Among the 2,400
HEIs in the perimeter, only about 900 are doctorate-awarding institutions. Thus, the
European Census of Higher Education Institutions 281
123
census extends well beyond research universities: not only does it include the non-
university sector in binary countries, but also small-scale educational providers like
military academies, arts schools, etc. However, 78% of ISCED 5 students are
enrolled in the doctorate-awarding institutions and half of the HEIs in the sample
include 95% of the ISCED 5 students (the concentration of research activities is
expected to be even stronger); accordingly, analyses based on the volume of activity
are not very sensitive to the choice of the perimeter, but institutional-level averages
(e.g. number of students per HEI) are. In cognitive and political terms, this
perimeter represents an unprecedented act of labeling as HEI institutions in the
remote periphery of the system, whose long-term implications are difficult to
evaluate and which does not fully match our own representation of higher
education.
Identifying Research-Active Institutions
The European Commission also requested the identification within the perimeter of
a smaller set of so-called research-active institutions, for which additional data
would have been collected concerning their research activities.
The normative value of a research mandate, with many HEIs in Europe striving
to acquire this status (Kyvik and Lepori 2010), makes this definition politically
sensible; statistical systems are in this respect powerful instruments of institution-
alization and thus actors are likely to look at them in terms of status and political
implications. A controversy emerged also in the EUMIDA team itself, as related to
different scholarly backgrounds, but also national situations. Those focusing on
(academic) research and from countries characterized by unitary systems considered
the PhD awarding status as the main criterion, while those with a focus on
comparative higher education pointed to the fact that in binary countries non-PhD
awarding institutions have a large volume of (applied) research activity (Kyvik and
Lepori 2010). Thresholds in terms of volume are also problematic as there is no
natural cut-off point, as beyond the top international universities the distribution of
research activities is more gradual, with a long tail of institutions performing some
(and different types of) research.
Again, the final choice was to adopt an extensive criterion of institutionalization
of research activities, which can be justified, as a research mission is likely to drive
strategic choices, as well as representations of other actors and thus can have
practical implications. This definition could also be operationalized in terms of
verifiable criteria, like the existence of an official research mandate, presence of
research units, inclusion in R&D statistics, awarding of PhDs and regular funding
for research projects. This was supported by DG research, which emphasized that
research active was a broader concept than research intensive and thus that the
restricted perimeter should not be limited to universities appearing in international
rankings.
Among the 2,420 units with full information in the census, 1,405 have been
characterized as research-active, including 555 institutions that do not grant the PhD
degree. In eight countries, all HEIs in the perimeter are considered as research-
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active; most of them are binary systems where non-university institutions have a
research mission, like Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and the Netherlands; however,
in Norway colleges are not included, even if they have a research mandate (Kyvik
and Skodvin 2003). In other countries, specific categories of institutions have been
excluded, among them colleges, art schools, and business schools. Other countries
made choices based on thresholds (for example, number of PhD students), while
very few countries split categories of institutions, like Germany where two-thirds of
the Fachhochschulen are considered research-active. These differences are largely
related to the organization of national higher education systems, as well as to
representations of the importance of the research mandate; clearly, national
considerations were more important than using comparable criteria across Europe.
Retrospectively, this issue was far less controversial than expected from the
perspective of political authorities and statistical institutions as it quickly became
clear that it was not realistic to expect the integration of additional data for the
research-active institutions in official statistics. As indicated by social conflict
theories, controversies are only raised when decisions on classifications bear direct
implications in terms of power and resources.
The Conventional Nature of Statistics: Definitions and Measurement Issues
A further task was to select a set of indicators and collect them for a single year, in
order to demonstrate the feasibility of the census and to estimate its costs. This
phase also displayed the relevance of operational and economic considerations: we
had to demonstrate that comparable data could be collected for the whole census
and for all countries and to design a system which would not put an excessive
burden on the NSA, meaning in practice that no additional data collection could be
envisaged.
On the Shoulders of Official Statistics
When looking at indicators, a paradox could be noticed. On the one side, EUMIDA
reports declare that their selection is based on a conceptual model of universities as
multi-functional organizations and on scholarly work on how to measure these
dimensions (Van Vught 2009; Daraio et al. 2011); on the other side, the list of
indicators is composed by a few descriptors (like region, year of foundation, degrees
awarded) and by the usual indicators from educational statistics, including the
number of students, staff, and budgetary data. When looking at some relevant
dimensions, research activities were measured only through PhD students and
internationalization through the share of foreign students, while no indicator is
provided for knowledge exchange and regional engagement activities.
Departures from the ‘‘ideal’’ list of indicators are explained by missing data, data
quality problems, or by a lack of agreement concerning definitions and methodology
for data collection. Following this argument, the EUMIDA team declares to have
pragmatically made the best of available data sources.
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From the perspective of literature on the social construction of statistical systems,
the interpretation is more ambiguous: for example, there is no lack of research
output measures—the fact that university rankings exist being a clear witness—
what is lacking is a consensus among statistical authorities and national authorities
on these measures. Moreover, for some dimensions data exists outside of official
statistics, but the project defined the perimeter of available data sources as those
collected by the NSA, the official reason being that statistical data are of better
quality than those from other sources.
The case of measurement of R&D expenditures in HEIs casts some doubts on this
explanation. Namely, that data is regularly collected by the NSA based on a
procedure defined in the Frascati manual (OECD 2000), but only about half of the
countries regularly perform a survey, while in many countries the calculation is
based on national coefficients derived from older surveys or even as ‘‘rules of
thumb’’ adopted by the NSA. As a result, in EUMIDA, only about 500 institutions
(38% of the research-active institutions) provided data on R&D expenditures and
their usability for European-level analysis is questionable. There seems to be a
limited willingness to invest in this area because of methodological problems, the
high effort required for data collection, and limited political interest.
In this respect, the political context of the census mattered. Namely, we
considered that DG research decided to cooperate with EUROSTAT for practical
reasons, but for political ones as well, since official statistics are the only source of
data endorsed by member states; in this respect, the EUMIDA census can also be
seen as a political response to the emergence of international rankings. While in
general terms, our quest for a broader set of measures covering HEIs and their
activities was reasonable, in the framework of this politico-institutional game, it
became a legitimizing argument to support the superiority of educational statistics
on other sources. Retrospectively, our behavior largely corresponded to theories of
rational behavior which foresees that humans tend to search for alternatives only in
the frame of reference they are given and to choose satisficing solutions given
cognitive and institutional limitations (Simon 1991), while trying to legitimize them
on more objective grounds.
This hints to the fact that scholars involved in indicators design and production
should pay attention to their forms of institutionalization because of their lasting
impact on the produced indicators (Lepori et al. 2008). The footprint of educational
statistics was in fact so strong that even two usual practices in business registers
managed by EUROSTAT itself—namely notations for multi-site organizations and
for demographic changes like mergers—were not retained and implemented in the
data collection.
A less visible but substantial influence of educational statistics concerns
definitions. As it was clear that the NSA would reuse available data, we had to
take as given the existing definitions from the UOE manual even if these do not
always fit the requirements of HEI-level statistics (UOE 2006). One case concerns
capital expenditures, which according to the UOE manual should be accounted for
on a cash accrual basis, a suitable procedure for public budgets, but questionable for
HEIs since they have increasingly been granted financial autonomy.
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However, a few adaptations were made. For example, the UOE manual foresees a
procedure to clean double counting of degrees in countries where the bachelor is
mostly an intermediary diploma, which works reliably only for national-level data;
in EUMIDA, it was preferred to single out the long degrees without an intermediary
qualification in order to improve comparability. In a few other cases, ongoing
improvements of statistical definitions were integrated from the onset, like using the
Bologna structure to classify degrees, since this organization of studies is now
widespread throughout Europe.
A domain where EUMIDA had more leeway to shape definitions concerned
descriptors, as these were considered mostly of scholarly interest, but unlikely to be
used for political and funding decisions, and they are non-statistical variables and
were collected by EUMIDA experts directly and not by the NSA. Despite their
apparent simplicity, some of them led to complex discussions in the EUMIDA team
itself. For instance, the year of foundation might be a well-defined concept for
Bologna University, but it is more problematic for institutions with a complex
history. Hence, the choice was made to include a foundation year—the year of
foundation of the first traceable ancestor—and a current status year—when the
institution got the present legal status and configuration. These choices are likely to
have a profound impact on the analysis of the demography of HEIs in Europe.
This discussion reveals also a specificity of the process of institutionalization of
S&T indicators coherent with sociological theory, namely that the fact that the
transition from experimental indicators to official ones, legitimized and objectivized
by official statistics, is first a conventional one, and second, when indicators move to
a taken-for-granted status existing controversies and methodological issues are
removed. While we considered our definitions of HEI descriptors as largely
experimental, following a scholarly culture where refinement is considered a normal
process, it might well be that they become integrated in an official census without
further questioning.
The Ghost of Rankings: Avoiding Controversial Relative Qualifications
The debate on the measures of research output—and its final outcome that no
measures were included in the census—is also revealing of the difference between
absolute and relative qualification and its deep impact in practice.
Namely, European universities have traditionally benefited, in the European
tradition, from absolute qualification, i.e. that the only distinction was between
universities and other educational institutions, but no relative qualification in terms
of different levels of quality was legitimate.
In the relation with their governments, associations of universities and
conferences of rectors have systematically refused the notion that it could be
possible to rank national institutions. However, rankings are published and influence
the decisions of students, families, and other interested audiences, even if they lack
any official recognition. While the increasing mobility of students and international
competition on skilled researchers makes it impossible for national governments to
control these processes, they remain free to delegitimize rankings pointing to their
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methodological limitations, without directly addressing the issue of relative
qualification.
In EUMIDA, two statistical offices were against even a simple classification
including existing basic indicators such as the number of students and staff. As the
officials stated, their governments were actively engaged against the practice of
ranking universities; once a census is produced, and basic data is officially
published, then nobody can prevent people from calculating their own indicators
(such as staff per student, or even cost per student) and draw rankings.
The majority of the NSA endorsed a moderate position, accepting to participate
in the creation of a census and considering relative qualification as unproblematic
when relating to volumes of activities, without any direct implication in terms of
measurement of quality. Most of them were probably aware that the census was
likely to be used also for relative qualifications, but their issue was not to make this
comparison impossible by keeping the basic data, but rather to avoid being involved
in the controversy by introducing these measures directly in the census.
In our view, this controversy conceals profound differences in the underlying
conception of HEI steering, on the one side, and of the function of S&T indicators,
on the other. In a more bureaucratic and centralizing tradition, the State is the only
actor deputed to rule higher education; accordingly, relevant information for
managing the system should be available internally, while publicly available
indicators should be used instrumentally to justify decisions taken on different
grounds (Godin 2005). On the contrary, in a more decentralized conception, where
the State is only one among several social actors involved in higher education,
openness and availability of information is relevant both for construction of
consensus (Barre´ 2004) and for allowing customers to make informed decisions in
quasi-market settings. Accordingly, the design of national higher education policies
influences the availability of micro-data as well—in some countries not even the
number of employees of universities are publicly available, whereas in others
detailed information on research performance is made public.
The opposition, even to a census including indicators with no reference to quality
or performance is in our view revealing the profound changes that the bare existence
of a census is likely to have. Namely, a great deal of data at the level of individual
HEIs is currently available from different sources, like university reports,
international databases, and independent S&T indicator producers (Lepori et al.
2008). On the symbolic side, an official census would reinforce the legitimacy of
undertaking comparisons at the level of individual HEIs (even if with data from
other sources). On the practical side, its availability could help to address some of
the criticisms these sources are subject to, like the inability to correctly identify the
perimeter—because of the lack of an official list of HEIs—or of assessing the
coverage of samples derived from bibliometric databases (for example, as share of
students or academic staff in the whole perimeter). Obviously, data on students and
staff would also allow computing some interesting indicators like productivity per
staff at least for those HEIs included in bibliometric databases—and thus strongly
enhance the value of other sources.
Against our normative position, that openness and informed choice by customers
is relevant for a well-functioning higher education system and should be weighted
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more than power interests of ministries or national prestige, our strategy was a
rational one; namely, we considered that establishing the principle of a census (and
its feasibility) was more important than the choice of indicators to include; in this
perspective, accepting that the census did not include many relevant indicators for
measuring HEI output was a reasonable decision. Our course of action was more
driven by political than by scholarly considerations.
Comparability as a Conventional Notion
Comparability obviously plays a central role in establishing a census: it requires the
creation of definitions and categories, the specification of boundary cases, the
allocation of individual cases to categories, and finally the comparison among
members of the same category. In all these activities there is room for conflicts. If
we consider PhD students, a number of common definitional elements are beyond
discussion, but there is considerable difference between those systems in which the
doctoral degree is considered a complement to undergraduate education to get an
employment and those in which it is largely limited to a career in research. Simply
comparing numbers of PhD students in international settings does not do justice to
reality. Another example is the definition of academic staff: depending on
institutional or normative idiosyncratic aspects, what comes to be defined as
academic staff is subject to considerable differences. Given the large diversity of
higher education institutions in Europe, proper contextualization becomes a central
aspect in using and interpreting the data (Almklov 2008).
In doing this, a commonly used practice can be defined as damage avoidance:
two things are considered comparable if comparison does not generate harm,
distortions, or unacceptable consequences, for (almost) all actors involved. Two
relevant issues in this respect are the notion of measurement error and the definition
of professional standards concerning data validation.
Sociology of measurement demonstrated that the notion of measurement error
plays a critical role when bridging local realities with measures (Mallard 1998;
Derksen 2000); for example, measurement errors originate from a lack of data, the
use of proxies instead of real measures, and imprecision in the measurement
techniques—so defining them as errors supports the validity of the measure, but it
also specifies the conditions of validity—for example, by allowing control when
observed differences between units are statistically meaningful. EUMIDA was, in
this respect, not different from other S&T indicators, where a look at methodo-
logical information reveals an impressive number of departures from definitions and
data-collection procedures which are potential sources of errors (Godin 2005): for
example, some countries provided staff data in headcount instead of full time
equivalents, different definitions of foreign students were adopted, budgetary data
for some countries include only third-party-funds.
As well-educated scholars in quantitative research, we assumed the position that
metadata should be considered as an integral part of a dataset and carefully looked
at; accordingly, the census is accompanied by a detailed document illustrating
departures from definitions. Retrospectively, we recognized that in official statistics
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comparability problems are not dealt with through the dissemination of metadata,
but through limitation and control of the usage; indicators are produced on request
by professional statisticians which are entitled to refuse—based on their expertise—
to produce them if not sufficiently robust. This is coherent with their taken-for-
granted status and their role as control instrument for the State and enhances their
usability and reach.
EUMIDA raises new issues in this respect. First, HEI-level indicators lack the
effect of aggregation, where measurement errors at the level of individual units are
expected to compensate for national-level averages. Second, it provides data meant
to be combined by different audiences with other sources to produce meaningful and
relevant indicators and thus means that the NSA is likely to lose their control on
usage. Third, while national aggregates are statistical constructions, which can
hardly be verified externally, institutional-level data (like numbers of students for
individual HEIs) can be checked by the actors themselves.
The conventional nature of comparability does, however, not mean to subscribe
to a view of social entities as infinitely malleable. Conventionality is not
arbitrariness. When actors come to an agreement, they also define standards and
establish procedures to ascertain the conformity of reality to standards. Despite its
status as an experimental project, EUMIDA was subject to this request and thus we
devised and implemented procedures for data quality and checking, including
largely symbolic acts such as the nomination of two quality experts, but also
controls of international coherency, statistical checks of outliers, and comparisons
with expected figures, as well as control of consistency of national totals with
EUROSTAT national aggregates.
It is fair to say that a number of mistakes and departures from definitions were
revealed by these procedures, but many more have emerged by using the dataset in a
later stage; for instance, data on foreign PhD students in a large European country
did not match those in national official publications and, most likely, they were
mistaken. This process would have required a much larger effort and thorough
testing of the data, while it was difficult to ascertain comparability without detailed
knowledge of the underlying reality and control over the data collection processes.
Both remarks underline the difficult situation of EUROSTAT when it comes to
certifying the validity of HEI-level data in a context where the NSA is explicitly
allowed to adapt the guidelines, while the documentation on data collection
practices is at best scarce.
Retrospectively, this discussion highlights that the current setting of the
European statistical system is tailored to the production of aggregated indicators
from micro-data that are not publicly accessible. National aggregates achieve their
taken-for-granted status largely because they cannot be compared with other sources
and thus the implications of the choices made (as well as possible distortions due to
national specificities and data quality problems) are not visible outside the realm of
official statistics.
While adhering in EUMIDA to the federal approach borne by the OECD was a
convenient political choice for a pilot project, we consider that, should this data be
integrated in the European statistical system, stronger standardization and a
reduction of national specificities will be required, as well as a more systematic
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checking of data provided by the NSA. Otherwise, comparison by users with
information from other sources, like university reports, might shed doubt on the
reliability of this data, and potentially affect the legitimacy of all educational
statistics.
In turn, this would require a deep change in the structure of the European
statistical system, from the current federal setting to a more unitary structure where
EUROSTAT can edict and enforce more precise guidelines on the type of data to be
collected and how this should be done and is allowed to intervene in the case of non-
compliance from the NSA. The current institutional setting of European statistics,
where in principle, the European Union sets guidelines, but in practice the NSA is
under the jurisdiction of national states, largely explains the difficulties in
integrating the census in the European statistical system.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the sociological analysis of higher education, on the
one hand, and measurement and statistics, on the other. By elaborating reflexively
on a project whose initial goal was mainly technical, we come to a number of
interesting conclusions. First, the process of defining categories for statistical
analysis is bound with conceptual controversies. There are very different
conceptions of what higher education is, of the legitimacy to deliver it, of the
relation between higher education and research. Any categorical definition creates,
by its very nature, boundaries that are contested. Second, while controversies are in
most cases rooted in concrete clashes of interests, actors almost never formulate
their positions in open terms. Power relations are vested into technical discussions
and not expressed openly. There is clearly room for critical analysis. Third, social
scientists should not advocate the role of knights of objectivity, although this is what
policymakers typically ask of them. Rather, the appropriate standing is one of
professionalism. Social scientists recognize the complexity of conflicts, support
actors in the elaboration of arguments, and contribute to the elucidation of issues at
stake. Thus, they would be better off assuming a pragmatic stance, without
themselves claiming detachment from the complexity of interests and visions at
stake. Rather, they should make their options transparent, asking actors to take a
position.
It is relevant to reinterpret this experience in the frame of the studies dealing with
the governance of science and, more precisely, with the relationships between
experts, on the one side, and policymakers and administrators, on the other (Jasanoff
2004). A growing body of literature has demonstrated that this relationship cannot
be represented as a linear process, where either experts produce solutions to political
problems or alternatives selected by policymakers based on normative judgments,
but rather as an interactive and recursive process, where both sides are jointly
involved in the definition of the issues, in the production of scientific expertise, in
value judgments and in the implementation of the chosen solution (Weingart 1999).
This helps to reveal the underlying normative and political interests that drove
our course of action, beyond the legitimizing position of being purely technical
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experts. While broader socio-political developments have created a demand for
micro-data, as well as a favorable political environment for their production, the
antecedents of EUMIDA have to be sought in a former project where we started
HEI-level data collection: we strategically disseminated these results not only in
scholarly publications, but also in expert reports and to the European Commission.
Thus, we were not ingenuous scholars discovering the political dimension of S&T
indicators in the course of action, but rather political entrepreneurs building on our
scholarly status to influence public policy.
Second, we were also motivated by normative assumptions on how science
policy should be made: in previous scholarly publications, we pointed to the lack of
selectivity and performance orientation of European research policies as a major
cause of the gap between Europe and the US. As economists, we strongly believe in
the virtue of competition and on the value of information to support public and
private choices; as citizens we think that in a pluralistic society information should
be disclosed and support the public debate, rather than kept by administrators—we
endorse an agora model of S&T indicators (Barre´ 2004) and thus we prefer models
of S&T indicator-production where different sources and institutions compete to a
monopoly by National Statistical Authorities (Lepori et al. 2008). As in the good
tradition of scientific expertise, these assumptions are supported by arguments and
empirical evidence—they are reasonable, but have a political rather than a scientific
status.
Third, our interests were at stake, too. Promoting the use of S&T indicators for
policymaking means displacing other types of scientific expertise with the one of
S&T indicators, designers, and producers; this translates to stronger influence in the
political arena, but in the scholarly community as well—admittedly, the field of
S&T indicators is mostly financed by these projects and thus we were not just
scientists illuminating political processes, we were also fighting for the (political,
scholarly, and economic) development of our field. The project gave us access to a
unique dataset on European higher education, on which we are publishing
intensively; the alliance with policy and statistical offices allows for control over a
critical resource for scholarly work, namely data. Of course, sociology of science
demonstrated that power and interests are essential components of the scientific
enterprise (Latour and Woolgar 1979); what is at stake, however, is transparency
concerning the complex nature of these processes and the fact that, when dealing
with boundary work with politics, interests and power relationships cannot be
separated from ideal reasons and scholarly competence. What our account makes
clear is that over the course of this project, we assumed the role of good citizens
trying to improve how our society is governed, the one of scholars driven by our
scientific interests and insights and of entrepreneurs constructing the material and
political basis of our business.
Interestingly, this leads us to reinterpret somewhat differently the paradox of
indicator production and circulation, namely the fact that once produced, indicators
become social objects themselves. They turn out to be independent not only from
the official source that has produced them, but even more so from social scientists
that have contributed to the definition and from social actors whose interests and
values have clashed. As scholars we were always concerned by the fact that, in this
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process, the complexity and nuances of the construction of indicators is largely lost
and we considered it dangerous that indicators are used without all the required
methodological cautions. Yet, exactly this taken-for-granted status largely accounts
for their role in the decision-making process and explains why their construction is
so highly controversial—and why scholars and policymakers are willing to invest so
much in this process: very much like other technical and organizational artifacts,
once established, S&T indicators embody in a durable manner, value choices and
power relationships and thus have a lasting influence on future decisions. By
shaping indicators, we are shaping the future governance of science systems as well,
in a way that we cannot, however, fully control.
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